Skipton International Limited and Mrs Sonia Zoe Dean
20th November 2026The Financial Services Business (Enforcement Powers) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law, 2020 (the “Enforcement Powers Law”)
The Banking Supervision (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law, 2020 (the “Banking Law”)
The Lending, Credit and Finance (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law, 2022 (the “LCF Law”)
The Regulation of Fiduciaries, Administration, Businesses and Company Directors, etc (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law, 2020 (the “Fiduciaries Law”)
Schedule 3 to Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law, 1999 (“Schedule 3”)
The Handbook on Countering Financial Crime (AML/CFT/CPF) (the “Handbook”)
The Finance Sector Code of Corporate Governance (the “Code of Corporate Governance”)
The Principles of Conduct of Finance Business (the “Principles of Conduct”)
Skipton International Limited (“SIL” or the “Licensee”)
and
Mrs Sonia Zoe Dean (“Mrs Dean”)
On 17 November 2026, the Guernsey Financial Services Commission (“the Commission”) decided:
To impose a financial penalty of £1,960,000 on the Licensee under section 39 of the Enforcement Powers Law;
To impose a financial penalty of £28,000 on Mrs Dean under section 39 of the Enforcement Powers Law;
To make an order under section 33 of the Enforcement Powers Law prohibiting Mrs Dean from holding a supervised role for a period of 1 year and 9 months;
To make an order under section 32 of the Enforcement Powers Law disapplying the exemption set out in 3(1)(g) of the Fiduciaries Law in respect of Mrs Dean for a period of 1 year and 9 months;
To make this public statement under section 38 of the Enforcement Powers Law.
The Commission considered it reasonable and necessary to make these decisions having concluded that the Licensee and Mrs Dean failed to ensure compliance with the regulatory requirements, and failed to meet the Minimum Criteria for Licensing (“MCL”) set out in Schedule 2 to the Banking Law.
Background
The Licensee is a Guernsey‑registered company licensed since 1995 to take deposits under the Banking Law. The Licensee is wholly owned by a UK parent building society.
The Licensee’s business includes savings accounts and mortgage lending (including UK buy‑to‑let lending to British expatriates and foreign nationals).
SIL was also licensed under Part II – Section 2 of the LCF Law for the business of providing Home Finance, when this law came into effect on 1 July 2023.
The Commission’s investigation primarily examined the Licensee’s conduct and compliance during the period November 2018 to May 2023.
SIL had engagements with the Commission in 2018, 2021 and 2022, all of which had resulted in specific failings being identified.
In 2023, the Commission conducted an onsite visit which exposed serious and systemic anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing failings (“AML/CFT”), including: missing client due diligence; absent or inadequate risk assessments; ineffective sanctions screening; and a breakdown in core compliance controls.
The 2023 visit also identified repeat deficiencies previously raised by the Commission.
Mrs Dean held the roles of Money Laundering Reporting Officer (“MLRO”) from May 2010 to February 2024 and Money Laundering Compliance Officer (“MLCO”) from March 2019 to March 2024.
Findings
The Commission found serious and systemic breaches of Schedule 3 and the associated rules in the Handbook, together with related governance and conduct failures, in particular, failures in the Firm’s core AML/CFT framework, from customer take on and throughout the business relationship, to overall corporate governance and systems of control.
The Licensee failed to act with: (i) prudence; (ii) with the professional skill appropriate to the nature and scale of its activities; and (iii) in a manner which would not damage the reputation of the Bailiwick as an international financial centre.
Failure to identify and verify customers, beneficial owners and key principals (Client Due Diligence (“CDD”))
Schedule 3, Paragraph 4 requires a licensee to take reasonable measures to identify and verify its customers and, where relevant, to identify and verify beneficial owners and other key principals, determine whether persons are acting on behalf of a customer, and understand the purpose and intended nature of the business relationship.
The Commission found that the Licensee failed to identify and verify the beneficial owners and key principals underlying a substantial population of its corporate deposit accounts; noting over 1,600 corporate deposit accounts, holding approximately £687,000,000 were affected by missing or unrecorded beneficial owner/key principal data.
The effectiveness of other AML/CFT controls such as sanctions screening and ongoing monitoring was undermined by these serious failings, which were known internally at SIL from at least August 2021, but were not addressed appropriately or reported adequately to the Board and consequently not remediated effectively.
For her part, Mrs Dean failed to accurately report these issues to the Board, thus not enabling it to understand the seriousness and far-reaching nature of the issues. The Licensee failed to notify the Commission of this serious breach.
Further, the Licensee misapplied the Handbook by treating a UK online cash management platform as an intermediary, instead of treating it as an introducer, or considering whether it could be a respondent in a correspondent relationship. As a result, SIL opened and maintained over 146 savings accounts between November 2018 and October 2019 and accepted over £46m in deposits without appropriate due diligence being applied; before trying to convert the relationship into an introducer arrangement, without materially adapting core AML/CFT controls, such as sanctions screening and transaction monitoring, which were ineffective.
Mrs Dean and others were aware of the issue from September 2019, yet did not escalate it to the Board as would have been expected of a regulated professional. The Commission was not notified of the issue.
Failure to properly conduct relationship risk assessments, taking into account relevant high-risk factors and to regularly review relationship risk assessments
Schedule 3, Paragraph 3 requires a licensee to conduct a relationship risk assessment prior to establishing a business relationship and to regularly review that assessment so as to keep it up to date, taking account of relevant risk factors and maintaining clear evidence of the basis on which the assessment has been made.
The Commission found that SIL failed to consistently conduct, evidence, or maintain adequate and relevant initial and periodic risk assessments of its customers, thereby compromising its ability to apply a risk‑based approach to its business.
Customer files reviewed by the Commission and by an independent third party identified deficiencies in the application of customer risk assessments, including the absence of documented initial risk assessments and periodic reviews.
The Commission also identified that SIL did not conduct AML/CFT relationship risk assessments on its mortgage customers until late 2019, despite this being a requirement for lending and deposit-taking business since 2007.
This serious failing meant the Licensee operated a significant part of its book without a documented, risk‑based understanding of its customer money laundering and terrorist financing (“ML/TF”) exposure, impeding the application of appropriate monitoring and enhanced measures (following its requirement with the introduction of the new Handbook in March 2019), and materially increasing both financial crime risk and reputational risk to the Bailiwick.
In addition, the Licensee failed to carry out appropriate and relevant relationship risk assessments on customers introduced to it by approved introducers (other regulated entities) and instead incorrectly assigned a low-risk rating to the introducer itself. It then automatically applied the low-risk rating to each of the underlying customers introduced by that entity.
This incorrect practice masked customer‑specific risk factors, leading to inappropriately low risk classifications, insufficient monitoring and review frequency, thereby materially increasing the Licensee’s exposure to ML/TF risk and undermining the effectiveness of sanctions screening and ongoing monitoring.
In one introduced relationship, SIL accepted a customer in 2020 via a local trust company where the introducer’s certificate included clear higher‑risk indicators (including, but not limited to him being a national from a sanctioned country and resident in the Middle East), yet SIL did not carry out an initial relationship risk assessment or a periodic review until three years later and instead treated the customer as low risk (the risk rating which the Licensee had applied to the local trust company which SIL had incorrectly applied to the introduced customer). When the introducer later disclosed to SIL in 2022 that the customer had received substantial funds from his father, who the introducer also raised proliferation‑financing concerns about, SIL failed to request further information from the introducer and did not reassess the customer’s risk rating accordingly.
Where risk assessments were evidenced, the Commission concluded they tended toward the superficial without adequate consideration of all relevant customer and relationship risk factors which failed to demonstrate clear, documented evidence of the basis on which the assessment had been made and that all relevant risk factors were considered. The Commission had raised concerns with the Licensee’s risk assessment process following a previous engagement in 2018, yet the same issues were again identified by the Commission in 2023, indicating ineffective remediation by the Licensee.
Failure to conduct enhanced measures and consistently apply enhanced customer due diligence (“ECDD”)
Schedule 3, Paragraph 5 requires a licensee to apply ECDD and/or enhanced measures where required by risk, including for higher‑risk relationships, and to take reasonable measures to establish and corroborate relevant information to mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risk. The Commission found that SIL failed to apply enhanced measures and consistently undertake ECDD.
The evidence recorded that the Licensee’s policies and procedures had no defined procedure for it to conduct enhanced measures, contributing to its inconsistent application by SIL.
Reviews of customer files conducted by both the Commission and an independent third party identified deficiencies in the application of enhanced measures and ECDD.
For example, the Commission found that SIL failed to apply ECDD to a long‑standing high‑risk family group whose risk profile included links to an extractive industry in a high-risk jurisdiction, historic adverse media, and a later assessment of politically exposed person (“PEP”) status by association. Despite these risk factors, SIL did not conduct periodic high‑risk reviews for a number of years on these customers, did not consistently evidence reasonable measures to establish and corroborate source of funds/source of wealth, and failed to consider relevant adverse information within its assessment, undermining its ability to manage the heightened ML/TF risk presented by the relationships.
Failure to conduct effective ongoing monitoring and transaction monitoring
Schedule 3, Paragraph 11 requires a licensee to conduct ongoing and effective monitoring of business relationships, including scrutiny of transactions and activity, and to maintain identification data in a way that supports monitoring.
The Commission found that the Licensee’s ongoing monitoring arrangements were not appropriate or effective for the nature and scale of its business, contributing to failures to identify and respond adequately to unusual activity.
SIL had no automated transaction monitoring system and instead relied on a manual, spreadsheet‑style review of daily transaction reports from its clearing bank, which materially increased the risk of errors, omissions and delayed escalation. This left the Licensee exposed to undetected unusual or suspicious activity and the consequential financial crime and reputational risk. Inappropriate consideration was given by the Licensee to whether this was appropriate or effective for its business model and scale of activities.
The Commission’s investigation found that the internal procedures applied by the Licensee which were intended to prevent (or pause) transactions on certain accounts were generic, inconsistently applied and routinely overridden. Transactions often proceeded without documented scrutiny or customer‑specific risk rationale. This meant unusual or potentially suspicious activity could occur on customer accounts without effective challenge.
For example, SIL established a business relationship in 2018 with a person born in a high-risk jurisdiction who was resident in the U.K., whose account was funded by repeated third‑party gifts stated to be for a relative’s education. Over 15 months, the account displayed a pattern of closely‑grouped credits and withdrawals totalling £759,000, which the Licensee facilitated without an evidenced understanding of the relationship’s purpose, the third‑party connection, or any rationale for using an account in Guernsey. The customer’s stated rationale changed over time, but in practice the account only ever received sterling funds from the third-party’s UK bank account which were then remitted to the customer’s own UK bank account, typically within a matter of days, a flow inconsistent with the intended purpose of a savings account and indicative of transitory, higher‑risk activity, which has the established hallmarks of money laundering. The Commission saw no consideration given by SIL to the economic rationale for this arrangement and concluded that Licensee’s controls, which were generic, were ineffective, poorly documented and did not evidence adequate scrutiny.
Failure to conduct and have in place an effective sanctions screening system
The Handbook requires a licensee to have appropriate and effective policies, procedures and controls to identify sanctioned persons and connected parties in a timely manner, and to ensure screening arrangements are effectively controlled and tested (Rules 12.22 and 12.34). The Commission found that deficiencies in data capture and systems capability resulted in significant gaps in sanctions screening across the Licensee’s book.
The Commission’s investigation identified serious deficiencies in the Licensee’s sanctions screening arrangements, including the omission of key principals and beneficial owners from screening due to missing customer information.
The Commission was particularly concerned that assurances were provided to the Commission regarding the effectiveness of screening at a time when the Licensee knew serious deficiencies in its sanctions screening system existed (including those linked to missing corporate structure information).
Furthermore, shortly prior to the Commission’s 2023 onsite visit, SIL identified that over 1,900 client records had been omitted from its screening system for approximately ten months as a result of a system filtering error but failed to inform the Commission of this fact, leaving the Commission to discover the issue itself.
The Licensee’s compliance monitoring programme failed to identify any of the issues relating to its sanctions screening system.
Failure to have in place appropriate and effective policies, procedures and controls to meet its Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) and disclosure requirements.
Schedule 3, Paragraph 12 requires a licensee to establish and maintain appropriate and effective procedures and controls to ensure compliance with disclosure obligations, including ensuring the MLRO (or nominated officer) takes account of all relevant information when considering suspicions. The Commission found that within the Licensee’s SAR framework, escalation and decision‑making was not applied consistently or robustly leading to instances where suspicion was not handled appropriately.
The Commission found examples where accounts were closed and funds returned to the customer, notwithstanding red flags and unresolved CDD/transaction concerns, without consideration given to whether there was a suspicion requiring externalising to the Financial Intelligence Unit.
The Commission found evidence of ineffective SAR controls in place at SIL in relation to a long‑standing high‑risk customer of Russian nationality, who changed their surname from a Russian name to a British surname in May 2022, shortly after the commencement of the Russia‑Ukraine war and during a period of heightened sanctions risk. The customer then sought later in 2022 to open additional accounts and made significant deposits from an account in Turkey which was not consistent with the Licensee’s understanding of the relationship. The Licensee recorded that the customer’s funds were described verbally by the customer as deriving from shares in a Russian company involved in aviation equipment (including military equipment), however no source of funds and source of wealth documents were held by SIL to corroborate this and no attempts were made by SIL to establish if the funds originated from sanctioned entities. SIL instead proceeded to close the accounts and return the funds, notwithstanding the evident red flags.
In another case, SIL opened a corporate account and subsequently processed withdrawal instructions received from an email address not recorded on file, belonging to a third-party who was not a party to the account, with call‑backs being made by the Licensee to that third party despite the absence of appropriate authority. Despite an internal SAR being raised after staff identified adverse media linking the third party to a prior forgery/theft offence of over £300,000 and an eight‑year director disqualification in the U.K. the Licensee closed the account, returned funds, and took steps to remove onboarding records from its system, which had the effect of deleting information relevant to the suspicion and evidencing ineffective controls and poor judgement in the handling of clear financial crime red flags.
The Commission concluded that these failings demonstrated that the Licensee’s SAR controls were not appropriate or effective.
Failure to have in place appropriate and effective policies, procedures and controls to identify, assess, mitigate, manage, review and monitor its money laundering and terrorist financing risks and have in place an effective programme for testing its compliance with Schedule 3 and the Handbook
Schedule 3, Paragraphs 2 and 15 require a licensee to establish and maintain appropriate and effective AML/CFT/CPF policies, procedures and controls, and to maintain an effective policy for reviewing compliance with those requirements. The Commission found that SIL’s financial crime prevention framework, including its compliance monitoring programme, did not provide effective testing of the Licensee’s compliance with its regulatory requirements and assurance over key controls and failed to identify and thereafter prevent serious issues from persisting.
The Licensee failed to establish policies, procedures and controls as may be appropriate and effective for the purposes of forestalling, preventing and detecting money laundering and terrorist financing. For instance, the Firm’s policies, procedures and controls did not explain in sufficient detail how Handbook requirements should be applied to the Firm’s operations so as to enable employees to understand what actions they must undertake in order to comply with regulatory and legal obligations.
The Licensee’s compliance monitoring programme was a list of static tests and failed to test key areas of its policies, procedures and controls. The Commission found that the Licensee’s inadequate and ineffective compliance monitoring programme contributed to significant issues persisting undetected or unaddressed, which included, but was not limited to the Licensee’s failure to receive CDD, conduct sanctions screening and transaction monitoring and report for tax purposes on the underlying customers of the online cash management platform as well as the missing beneficial owners and key principals of the corporate structures, the deficient sanctions screening system and inadequate ongoing and transaction monitoring.
Failure to meet the requirements of the Transitional Provisions
In 2019, significant amendments were made to the Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law, 1999, in order to align it with international standards for combating money laundering and terrorist financing, particularly those set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
As part of this update, the Commission released the Transitional Provisions, which are detailed in Chapter 17 of the Handbook.
The Transitional Provisions required licensees to complete a full review of their book of business by the required deadline of 31 December 2021 and take all steps deemed necessary to ensure that relationship risk assessments were conducted and appropriate, CDD measures applied, including ECDD and/or enhanced measures where relevant, in accordance with Paragraphs 2 to 8 of Schedule 3 and Chapters 3 to 9 of the Handbook (Handbook Rules 17.27 and 17.28).
Despite being aware of its obligations under the Transitional Provisions, SIL did not review its book of business or ensure its risk assessments, CDD, ECDD and enhanced measures were aligned with the new Handbook.
Although Transitional Provisions were discussed at Board level, the requirements under Handbook Rules 17.27 and 17.28 were not raised with the Board, including by Mrs Dean, leaving the Board unaware of the scope of the Licensee’s regulatory obligations and non-compliance.
Failure to maintain adequate systems of control of its business and records
Schedule 3, Paragraph 14(6) requires that a licensee keep documents and CDD information in a readily retrievable manner that must be made available promptly including to the Commission and those listed in Paragraph 14(6)(b).
The MCL requires, inter alia, a licensee to conduct its business in a prudent manner, and provides that a business cannot be regarded as prudent unless it maintains adequate systems of control of its business and records (MCL Paragraph 6(2)(d)(ii)), with regard also being had to the robustness and ongoing development of those systems (MCL Paragraph 6(3)(b)). The Commission found that SIL fell materially short of this standard.
In particular, SIL’s systems for record‑keeping were not fit for purpose, including weaknesses that prevented the Licensee from capturing, maintaining and retrieving complete and accurate customer and connected‑party information. The Commission found that these deficiencies were driven by poor data management and systems limitations (including the Licensee’s inability to properly record corporate structures and associated parties in its core systems), compounded by inadequate internal control and assurance over the integrity of the Licensee’s records.
Significantly, SIL’s incomplete records undermined key AML/CFT controls, including its ability to conduct effective sanctions screening and ongoing monitoring where key ownership was missing or not properly recorded. The Licensee’s inadequate systems of control of its business and records left SIL operating with material gaps in risk understanding and control effectiveness, increasing its exposure to financial crime risk and the associated reputational risk to the Bailiwick.
Failure to adhere to the Principles and Guidance of the Guernsey Financial Services Commission Finance Sector Code of Corporate Governance and the Principles of Conduct of Finance Business
The Board failed to maintain overall responsibility for the risk management of the Licensee primarily as a result of the failure of the Management Committee (the Licensee’s executive committee) to appropriately and effectively assess and manage risk as required by the Principle 5.1 of the Code of Corporate Governance.
The Licensee failed to adhere to the Principles of Conduct of Finance of Business by:
Failing to act with skill, care and diligence as required by Principle 2;
Failing to organise and control its internal affairs in a responsible manner, keeping proper records and have adequate arrangement to ensure its staff are suitable, adequately trained and properly supervised and it has well-defined compliance procedures as required by Principle 9; and
Failing to deal with the Commission in an open and co-operative manner and keep the Commission promptly informed of anything concerning the financial institution which might reasonably be expected to be disclosed to it as required by Principle 10.
The Commission found no evidence of consumer detriment arising from the failings identified above.
Mrs Sonia Dean
The Commission found that Mrs Dean failed to meet the MCL by failing to consistently act with competence, soundness of judgement, diligence and knowledge and understanding of her legal and professional obligations by:
Failing to take reasonable steps, as MLCO, to review, maintain and monitor the effectiveness of SIL’s SAR procedures and controls and then bring any deficiencies to the attention of the Board for appropriate remedial action to be taken;
Failing to ensure appropriate escalation of regulatory issues to the Board within a reasonable timeframe once identified;
Failing to, at all times, consider the implications of money laundering red flags which could potentially give rise to suspicion of money laundering and act in accordance with the competence and diligence expected of a MLRO;
Failing to identify that SIL could not treat the online cash management platform as an intermediary, or consider whether a correspondent relationship was appropriate leading to the Licensee thereafter failing to conduct relationship risk assessments and CDD on the underlying customers;
Failing to take appropriate action by opting to continue the onboarding of corporate customers when made aware of the Firm’s serious regulatory breaches in relation to the corporate structures;
Failing to take reasonable steps, as MLCO, to ensure the Licensee complied with the Transitional Provisions detailed in the 2019 Handbook;
Failing to take reasonable steps to correct an inaccurate answer provided to the Commission in April 2021 regarding SIL’s sanction screening after becoming aware it was inaccurate; and
Failing to notify the Commission that over 1,900 customers had been omitted from SIL’s sanction screening for roughly ten months.
Aggravating Factors
The Licensee failed to effectively and appropriately escalate and remediate issues despite repeated opportunities, leading to the Licensee’s regulatory non-compliance persisting for an extended period of time.
The Licensee reassured the Commission that Risk Mitigation Programmes were completed effectively but this appeared to not be the case; this gave the Commission false assurances that the actions had been met, undermined supervisory oversight, delayed intervention, and increased the risk of continued non-compliance and heightened exposure to financial crime due to outstanding remedial actions and ineffective controls.
The Licensee is required to submit regulatory returns to the Commission, which are central to the Commission’s ability to supervise effectively. Because SIL had not consistently identified and verified customers and failed to maintain adequate systems of control of its business and records, its previous returns are highly likely to have been inaccurate and thereby impeding the Commission’s ability to supervise it.
Mitigating Factors
The Licensee and Mrs Dean co‑operated with the Commission during the investigation and enforcement process.
The Licensee has taken substantial steps and invested significant resources to remediate the failings identified in this public statement.
SIL has informed the Commission that it has transformed its governance, compliance and risk assessment framework along with its onboarding, CDD and ECDD, SAR reporting, sanctions screening and transaction monitoring procedures.
The Licensee and Mrs Dean agreed to settle at an early stage of the process and this has been taken into account in setting the financial penalties and the duration of Mrs Dean’s prohibition.
Which replaced the Regulations of Fiduciaries, Administration Businesses and Client Directors, etc (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Law, 2000 on 1 November 2021.
Which replaced the Criminal Justice (Proceeds of Crime) (Financial Services Businesses) (Bailiwick of Guernsey) Regulations, 2007 on 31 March 2019.